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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
cumstances tend to connect the accused with the crime. If it is decided
that the confession is to be admitted, the jury, of course, should also
be warned of the doubtful validity of statements made while asleep. 8
By the use of this warning in conjunction with the requirement of
added corroboration, a two-fold protection would be provided which
would insure that any conviction based upon a confession made by a
defendant while asleep would be grounded in fact.
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR INDUCING NON-PERFORMANCE
OF UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACT
Evans v. Mayberry, 278 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1955)
Plaintiff entered into an oral contract to purchase real estate from
his brother. Defendant, a third party with knowledge of the existence
of the contract, induced the vendor to sell the property to another.
In plaintiff's action for damages for inducing the vendor's non-per-
formance of the contract, the trial court sustained defendant's de-
murrer. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court, affirming the ruling
of the trial court, held that since the contract was not enforceable
between the parties because of the Statute of Frauds,' defendant could
not be held liable for inducing its non-performance. 2
Grounded in antiquity,3 the tort of "inducing breach of contract"
was limited to liability for enticing a servant from his master's em-
ployment 4 until 1853 when, in Lumely v. Gye,5 the doctrine was ex-
tended to include interference with any contract of personal service.
Later, the doctrine was further expanded to include contracts other
than those for personal services.6 The rule has been generally accepted
28. A problem arises where there is a question as to whether the accused was
asleep. This being a question of fact, it would have to be decided by the jury.
If the judge would admit the confession only if the accused was awake at the
time of making the confession, he should instruct the jury to disregard the con-
fession if they find he was asleep. See cases cited in notes 26 and 27 supra.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7831 (Williams 1934).
2. Evans v. Mayberry, 278 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1955). The action was based on
a Tennessee statute providing for the recovery of treble damages against a person
who procures the breach of a "lawful" contract. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7811
(Williams 1934). In Watts v. Warner, 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1925), the
court held that under this statute an unenforceable contract was not a "lawful"
contract, and thus was not within the purview of the statute. As a matter of
statutory construction, this result is highly questionable since a contract may be
unenforceable merely because of technical defects and yet may not be "unlawfdl"
in the sense, of being illegal or contrary to public policy. While the court in the
principal case relied on the Watts case, the decision was not reached primarily on
the basis of statutory construction. See text supported by notes 22-24 infra.
3. For the history of the action, see PROSSE, TORTS 722-25 (2d ed. 1955);
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. Rnv. 663 (1923).
4. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 723; Sayre, supra note 3, at 665-66.
5. 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
6. Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (C.A.).
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in the United States7 and is set forth in section 766 of the Restate-
ment of Torts.8 Inducing breach of contract is essentially an inten-
tional torV which requires that the defendant know of the contract
and intend to prevent its performance.,' If these elements are satis-
fied, it can be broadly stated that, unless the interference is "privi-
leged,"' , recovery will be permitted for inducing the breach of virtu-
ally any type of contract enforceable between the pa-ties.12
In addition, the majority of courts have held that the enforceability
of the contract between the parties is not a necessary prerequisite to
liability. Even though the contract is unenforceable by reason of the
Statute of Frauds,'" formal defects," lack of mutuality,'5 or uncer-
tainty of terms, recovery has been permitted against the interfering
third person. Several reasons have been advanced for allowing recov-
ery in these situations. One explanation is that a defense such as the
Statute of Frauds is available only to the parties to the contract and
cannot be utilized by a third person. 7 Also, it has been urged that in
most cases, the parties would have consummated their agreement even
though not legally bound to do so.Y Furthermore, it has been pointed
out that liability is based on interference with the contractual relation-
7. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941); Sorenson v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927); Downey v. United
Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976 (1953); Bryant v. Barber,
237 N.C. 480, 75 S.E.2d 410 (1953). See Annots., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952), 84
A.L.R. 43 (1933).
8. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 766 (1939).
9. PROSSER, TORTS 732-35 (2d ed. 1955). But see Cue v. Breeland, 78 Miss.
864, 29 So. 850 (1901) (Recovery was permitted when defendant negligently drove
logs into bridge which plaintiff was under contract with county to keep in repair.),
10. Rinnander v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 114 Colo. 506, 166 P.2d 984
(1946); Thomason v. Sparkman, 55 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). See
PROSSER, TORTS 734 (2d ed. 1955) ; Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1244-46 (1952).
11. See text supported by notes 26-30 infra.
12. The courts, however, have consistently refused to predicate liability on
interference with certain types of contractual relationships. Thus, recovery has
been denied when the contract is "illegal" or contrary to public policy. Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (contract in restraint of
trade) ; Bailey v. Banister, 200 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1952) (purchase of restricted
Indian land); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940)
(usury). Also, there is no liability for interference with a marriage contract.
Brown v. Glickstein, 347 11. App. 486, 107 N.E.2d 267 (1952); Nelson v. Melvin,
236 Iowa 604, 19 N.W.2d 685 (1945); Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169
N.E. 491 (1929).
13. Powell v. Leon, 172 Kan. 267, 239 P.2d 974 (1952); Vaught v. Pettyjohn,
104 Kan. 174, 178 Pac. 623 (1919); Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 69 N.W.2d 667
(Minn. 1955); Leibovitz v. Central Nat'l Bank, 75 Ohio App. 25, 60 N.E.2d 727
(1944). See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 766, comment c (1939).
14. Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (1871).
15. Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold, 40 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 105 N.J.L. 345, 144 Atl. 715 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929).
16. Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 105 N.J.L. 345, 144 At. 715 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929).
17. Powell v. Leon, 172 Kan. 267, 239 P.2d 974 (1952); Louis Kamn, Inc. v.
Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
18. Powell v. Leon, 172 Kan. 267, 239 P.2d 974 (1952); Royal Realty Co. v.
Levin, 69 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1955). See PossER, TORTS 726 (2d ed. 1955).
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ship,:9 and thus a binding contract between the parties is not deemed
essential.20 Indeed, one writer has suggested that the interfering third
person's conduct is more reprehensible when the contract is not legally
enforceable because the plaintiff in such a case has no right to recover
on the contract.21
The court in the principal ease, however, elected to take the position
adopted by a minority of courts, holding as a matter of law that no
liability can be predicated on int6rference with an unenforceable con-
tract. Apparently unimpressed by the argument that the Statute of
Frauds could be pleaded as a defense only by the parties to the con-
tract, the court relied on a prior Tennessee case,22 and on a Texas
decision23 which stated that it would be "legally incomprehensible"
to impose liability on an interfering third person when the principal
parties were not themselves bound by the contract. 4
The primary difficulty in deter-mining whether to impose liability in
these cases appears to result from the way in which the courts view
the nature of the cause of action. If the cause of action is based on
interference with the contractual relationship,25 it would seem to
follow that the fact that the contract was not enforceable between the
parties should not affect the ultimate result. If, however, the position
is taken that the tort of inducing breach of contract is primarily de-
signed to prevent interference with enforceable contracts, a court may
justifiably feel that permitting an action when the contract was un-
enforceable would unreasonably extend the basic principle underlying
the action.
Even if it is accepted that the enforceability of the contract between
the parties is not a prerequisite to recovery, it is apparent that an
undue extension of liability will result in absurdities in some cases.
To eliminate this problem in the area of enforceable contracts, courts
have recognized that the interference may be privileged in numerous
factual situations.26 Thus, for example,2 7 recovery has been denied
19. An agreement may be a contract even though it is voidable and unenforce-
able between the parties. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766, comment c (1939).
20. PROSSER, TORTS 725 (2d ed. 1955).
21. HARPER, TORTS 476 (1933).
22. Watts v. Warner, 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1924). See note 2 supra.
23. Davidson v. Oakes, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 128 S.W. 944 (1910). The
Davidson case was disapproved in Yarber v. Iglehart, 264 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953).
24. See also Sweeley v. Gordon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 385, 118 P.2d 842 (1941) (no
liability for inducing one to stand on a "legal right," i.e., the Statute of Frauds).
25. See text supported by notes 19, 20 supra.
26. Lancaster v. Hamburger, 70 Ohio St. 156, 71 N.E. 289 (1904); Gregory v.
Dealers' Equipment Co., 156 Tenn. 273, 300 S.W. 563 (1927) ; O'Brien v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 62 Wash. 598, 114 Pac. 441 (1911).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 767 (1939), provides:
In determining whether there is a privilege to act in the manner stated
in § 766, the following are important factors:(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
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when the defendant has interfered to protect a presently existing
economic interest, 28 or to give advice in response to a request by one
of the contracting parties,- or to protect the interests of a person
toward whom he stands in a position of responsibility."0 It would
seem that if recovery is to be permitted at all in an action involving
interference with an unenforceable contract, these same privileges
should be recognized.3 '
Apparently the court in the principal case has determined that ac-
tions for interference with contract should be restricted to situations
in which there is a legally enforceable contract. To those who view
with suspicion the tort of inducing breach of contract, such an attitude
seems perfectly justifiable. Courts which accept the view adopted in
the principal case thus will dismiss the action as a matter of law when-
ever the pleadings disclose that the contract was unenforceable be-
tween the parties. If the majority view is accepted, however, whether
recovery is to be permitted should depend, not merely on a matter of
pleading, but rather on a careful factual determination of whether the
interest of the defendant is of sufficient merit to justify his interfer-
ence with the relationship between the contracting parties.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNER FOR NEGLIGENCE
OF Ex-CONVICT SERVANT
Boland v. Love, 222 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
Plaintiff was injured due to the negligent driving of defendant's
gardener, who had taken defendant's automobile from its garage in
(b) the nature of the expectancy with which his conduct interferes,
(c) the relations between the parties,
(d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor and
(e) the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and
the actor's freedom of action on the other hand.
For specific privilege situations, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 768-74 (1939);
§ 768 (privilege of competitor), § 769 (privilege of one having financial interest
in business of person induced), § 770 (privilege of person responsible for welfare
of another), § 771 (inducement to influence another's business policy), § 772
(privilege to advise), § 773 (privilege to assert bona fide claim), § 774 (privilege
to break restriction violative of public policy).
27. The following list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
28. Meason v. Ralston Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224 (1940) (mort-
gagee); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Wash. 598, 114 Pac. 441 (1911)
(lessor of property).
29. It is often the duty of lawyers, doctors, and bankers to give such advice.
However, the privilege is not limited to professional persons. See Arnold v.
Moffitt, .30 R.I. 310, 75 At. 502 (1910) (in answer to request, electrical inspector
for insurance company advised employer that plaintiff's bill for electrical work
was exorbitant).
30. Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906) (mother attempting to protect
child); Terry v. Zachry, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (employee in-
ducing corporation to litigate claim).
31. One writer has suggested that liability should depend on motive; there
should be no liability unless the interfering defendant sought the same object
as did the plaintiff in making the contract. Sayre, supra note 3, at 663.
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